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Abstract 
Italy is frequently reprimanded by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) over the amount of time it takes Italian courts 
to reach verdicts. As stated by President Giorgio Napolitano, European Court decisions have lead to calls for an urgent 
intervention in order to save time and costs in Italian judicial system. Efficiency and effectiveness are key targets for managing 
justice in Italy. Nevertheless they are not easy to achieve. In this paper, using a Stochastic Frontier Model (SFM) we compare the 
Italian courts efficiency to identify strong and weak points. 
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1. The justice efficiency 
Since the late 1990s, the increased role of judiciaries in society and the increasing demand from taxpayers and 
voters, for the state to be operated more efficiently and at less of an expense (both emotional and financial) to the 
people, started to affect the traditional ideas and impressions of the judicial administration, its organization and its 
founding values. Before then, we had not given much thought as to how access to justice was organized, because it 
was taken for granted, that if judicial independence were guaranteed, then access to justice would also be 
guaranteed. Bureaucracies in general, and judicial administrations in particular, were increasingly seen as an old and 
monstrous machine, with much red tape and in need of much repair. Furthermore, it was often impossible for people 
to know who was responsible for what, which made having to go to the state with their issues time-consuming and 
frustrating.  
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Evidence-based programming requires that programme outcomes be monitored and evaluated, in order to 
determine whether the programme’s objectives have been achieved. It also requires that evaluation findings be 
reviewed and integrated into future programming and that good practices and lessons learned through the conduct of 
previous programmes be identified and taken into account in designing future interventions. In order to carry out all 
those steps, sound measuring techniques and processes and clear criteria for measuring programme outcomes are 
required.  
The main objective of the present publication is to provide some statistical techniques useful for evaluating the 
efficiency of the Italian Judicial System. 
Experts consider the Italian Judicial System chaotic and rather poorly managed: busy, too many transactions and 
high costs. According to the Bank of Italy, the inefficiency of the Italian Justice System, in economic terms, 
accounts for 1% of GDP. The compensation for the sluggard justice, rose from 5 million euro in 2003, to 40 million 
in 2008, reaching 84 million in 2011.  
Italy is frequently reprimanded by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) over the amount of time it 
takes Italian courts to reach verdicts. Furthermore, in May 2013, the ECtHR set Rome a one-year deadline to find a 
solution to chronic overcrowding in Italy's jails. Italian prisons are more than 15% over capacity and overcrowding 
is a factor in high suicide rates. 
The Justice Minister Cancellieri said in the Lower House in January 2014: 
“The system is struggling despite the response of the Italian judiciary, which came first in terms of 
productivity in the latest EU report on justice efficiency. Higher workloads (in terms of criminal and 
civil cases) and greater scope of action for the magistrates are at the origins of the slowness of the 
verdicts and fears that the overexposure of the judiciary can alter the delicate balance between 
powers of the State”. 
The minister said that Italy's courts were faced with over eight million outstanding cases in June 2013, 5.2 
million civil ones and almost 3.5 million criminal ones. 
As for overcrowding, she said moves to grant early release for less serious crimes and the use of alternative 
punishments to jail had helped reduce the prison population. She said there were 62,326 inmates on January 9, 2014 
compared to 64,056 on December 4, 2013. President Giorgio Napolitano has repeatedly called for amnesties to help 
improve conditions in Italy's jails. 
The experts agree that judicial system ought to be efficient, effective and fair, but they do not agree about the 
suggested way to improve it. 
The Italian government is planning to cut expenses and to measure justice efficiency, according to the best 
practices performed by some other courts (Cook, 1982, Sciacca, 2007).  
The Public Administration and Innovation Minister with the CSM Vice President signed a document  to change 
justice governance and to evaluate magistrates observing the Best Practices Project according to CAF (Common 
Assessment Framework) for Justice. 
In this paper we compare the 26 Italian appellate Courts using a Stochastic frontier Model in order to estimate 
their efficiency and to analyze the causes of deviations from the maximum efficiency.  
The data (exhausted civil and criminal judgments in a year, for each of the 26 Appellate Courts) comes from 
Ministry of Justice official website (www.giustizia.it). The number of exhausted cases is a proxy of the output of the 
judicial system and it can be used to produce an annual ranking of the courts’ productivity.  
We compare inhomogeneous entities, therefore joining civil and criminal processes in the same analysis and 
using the costs for each court as a dimensional indicator could be dangerous or inappropriate. Nevertheless it is a 
first step in analyzing a complex phenomenon.  
Another weak aspect lies in the poor consideration of contextual factors for the different courts, for which the 
number of occurring cases is an exogenous factor. Unfortunately, the available data only allows us to make just a 
summary analysis of the phenomenon and can generate misleading conclusions.  
For this reason the results presented below should be interpreted as a first stage of a more complex analysis. 
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2. The justice system  
The overall budget of the Italian justice system is 7,716,811,000 euros. This includes the budget for the court 
system, legal aid, public prosecution services, prison system, probation services, judicial protection of juveniles and 
functioning of the Ministry of Justice. 
There are 6,654 professional judges sitting in ordinary and administrative courts, including 5,366 at first instance, 
993 at second instance and 295 at highest instance. There are no professional judges sitting in courts on an 
occasional basis. In addition to professional judges, there are 3,121 non-professional judges performing various 
judicial functions in first instance in Italy. 
Of the 24,661 non-judge staff units of personnel who are working in ordinary and administrative courts, for 9,699 
the main tasks are: to assist judges with case file preparation (during and outside of court hearings), recording court 
proceedings, helping to draft the decisions, and the execution other activities necessary for the smooth running of 
court proceedings. Another 107 units are in charge of different administrative tasks and of the management of the 
courts (management of  human resources, as well as of  premises and equipment, including computer systems, 
financial and budgetary management, training management).  
Finally, there are 702 technical staff and another 14,153 units working as assistants, receptionists, porters and 
other judicial staff. In Italy the ratio of professional judges sitting in courts to non-judge staff who are working in 
court is 1 to 3.7. 
3. The measurement of efficiency 
In order to measure the degree of efficiency of a unit it is necessary to define the production frontier, which 
identifies the set of the best combinations of inputs. 
Recent interest in estimating inefficiency arises out of concerns about the justice delays. There are many potential 
applications for accurate provider-level estimates of inefficiency (e.g., organizational improvement, public 
reporting). There are various systems used for studying efficiency either by using an unidimensional or a 
multidimensional approach (Fig. 1)  
 
Fig. 1. Approaches to Inefficiency Estimation . 
Following a multivariate approach, among the econometric techniques that generates provider-level (i.e. Justice 
court-level) estimates of inefficiency, we can measure efficiency as a departure from a frontier or by evaluating the 
difference with respect to average values. 
A parametric or non–parametric approach can be followed, leading to Stochastic Frontier Analysis and to Data 
Envelopment Analysis respectively. 
We used the Data Envelopment Analysis (Charnes et al., 1978) for a similar model (Antonucci et al., 2011), but 
in this paper we apply the SFA technique (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen & van den Broeck, 1977).  
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This technique, widely used to estimate individual efficiency scores, defines the production technology for a 
particular industry using a stochastic production frontier in which output is expressed as a function of inputs, a 
random error component and a one-sided technical inefficiency component which captures deviations below the 
optimal output level (frontier).  
A stochastic frontier model is often written as: 
q = f(x1, x2,…., xN)+Ȟ íu 
where : 
q  represents the general production function obtained from the input factors  x1, x2, …, xN ; 
Ȟ  is the noise component, that describes random shocks affecting the production process. These shocks are 
not directly attributable to the producer or the underlying technology. Each producer is facing a different 
shock, but we assume the shocks are random. Usually it is a two-sided normally distributed variable. 
Standard assumptions of zero mean, homoscedasticity and independence is assumed. 
u  is the non-negative technical inefficiency component, which represents technical inefficiency to a general 
production function.  This means that actual output is less than what is postulated by the production. The ui 
are identically and independently distributed non-negative half normal (truncated at 0) random variables. 
The components  v  and  u  are independently distributed and constitute a compound error term, with a specific 
distribution to be determined, hence the name of “composed error model” as is often referred. 
Often a Cobb–Douglas function is used to model the production function. 
It represents the technological relationship between the amounts of two or more inputs, particularly physical 
capital and labour, and the amount of output that can be produced by those inputs. The Cobb-Douglas form was 
developed and tested against statistical evidence by Charles Cobb and Paul Douglas during 1927–1947: 
.)exp()exp()lnlnexp( 22110 iiiii uvxxq −⋅⋅β+β+β=  
So the stochastic frontier model can be written as:  
iiiii uvxxq −+β+β+β= 22110 lnlnln  . 
In general, a stochastic frontier model with several inputs and general functional form (which is linear in its 
parameters) is generally written as 
ln qi = ln xi'β + vi íui .  
By construction, the inefficiency term is always between 0 and 1. This means that, if a firm is inefficient, then it 
produces less than what is expected from the inputs used by the firm at the given technology. 
Technical efficiency can be defined as the ratio of “observed” (“realised”) output to the stochastic frontier output 
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The inefficiency effects model was formulated and estimated jointly with the Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontier 
model in a single stage maximum likelihood estimation procedure, using the computer software Frontier Version 4.1 
(Coelli, 1996). Here, the parameterization of Battese and Corra is used, replacing   ı2V   and   ı
2
U   with   
ı2 = ı2V + ı
2
U       and      γ = σ
2
U/(σ
2
V + σ
2
U).  
This is done by calculating the maximum likelihood estimates.  
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4. The Model 
In order to measure the efficiency of the Justice system we considered the demand and the offer of justice 
services, and the resources available in terms of number of professional judges. The data presented in this paper 
(Table 1) comes from General Statistic Directorate of the Ministry of Justice. This office belongs to SISTAN and 
offers certified data but the latest figures available are referred to 2011 (2 years delay). The number of judges 
represented comes from CSM (Superior Council of Magistracy) that gives an updated list of the judges in service at 
the different offices but does not allow us to recover the history of the data stream of the previous years. 
Table 1. Number of resolved and pending civil, commercial and criminal cases,  
and number of professional judges sitting in courts, year 2011. 
District Resolved cases   (Yi) Pending cases  (X1i) Judges   (X2i) 
Ancona 188,057 155,589 150 
Bari 334,359 573,272 388 
Bologna 495,864 464,121 393 
Brescia 277,880 280,482 226 
Cagliari 178,437 214,728 218 
Caltanissetta   49,369   59,238   98 
Campobasso   47,803   44,771   52 
Catania 209,967 302,218 294 
Catanzaro 232,949 362,763 245 
Firenze 426,874 426,293 392 
Genova 233,599 222,024 280 
L'Aquila 194,491 173,071 174 
Lecce 266,185 338,785 160 
Messina 114,804 192,188 136 
Milano 735,236 598,757 750 
Napoli 1,012,766   1,414,309   924 
Palermo 229,164 264,184 395 
Perugia 112,577 123,411   93 
Potenza   74,004 108,224   89 
Reggio Calabria   96,224 155,700 173 
Roma 914,831 1,363,432   1299   
Salerno 179,153 303,548 183 
Torino 465,070 375,492 487 
Trento   95,154   47,967 124 
Trieste 142,251   87,086 156 
Venezia 419,935 408,641 342 
Sum 7,727,003   9,060,294   8,221   
 
The variable Yj (output) is the  number of resolved civil, commercial and criminal cases, during year 2011. The 
input variables are: 
X1i: Number of pending civil, commercial and criminal cases, year 2011 
X2i: Number of professional judges sitting in courts, year 2011 
The Cobb-Douglas production function with one output Yj and 2 inputs X1i  and X2i, assuming a half- normal 
distribution for Technical Inefficiency, gives the estimates shown in Table 2. The LR test (9.39>Ȥ20.025 with 3 df) 
indicates the presence of a significant Technical Efficiency. 
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Table 2. Estimates of the parameters and standard errors of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function (with 2 inputs and 1 output). 
Parameters Estimation Std.err.. t-ratio 
ȕ0 1.730 0.2506   6.905 
ȕ1 0.729 0.0360 20.256 
ȕ2 0.225 0.0434   5.184 
ı2 0.049 0.0422   1.156 
γ  0.989 0.002 647.364   
Table 3. Estimated Technical Efficiency and rank of the Italian courts. 
District Estimated Technical Efficiency Rank 
Milano 0,997 1 
Bologna  0,995 2 
Trento 0,990 3 
Trieste  0,988 4 
Ancona 0,986 5 
Torino 0,977 6 
Venezia  0,966 7 
L'Aquila 0,946 8 
Brescia  0,932 9 
Firenze  0,927 10 
Lecce  0,916 11 
Genova 0,873 12 
Perugia  0,870 13 
Napoli 0,866 14 
Campobasso 0,833 15 
Cagliari 0,775 16 
Roma 0,767 17 
Palermo  0,745 18 
Catanzaro  0,737 19 
Catania  0,709 20 
Bari 0,703 21 
Potenza  0,696 22 
Messina  0,675 23 
Salerno  0,674 24 
Caltanissetta  0,665 25 
Reggio Calabria  0,617 26 
Mean (Median) 0.839     (0.868)  
The stochastic frontier function for the ith Court is therefore 
qi = exp(1.73 + 0.73 ln x1i + 0.22 ln x2i + Ȟi í ui) = 5.64×2.07x1i×1.25x2i + exp(Ȟi í ui) . 
Using the above model, the technical efficiency is estimated by the ratio of the observed output divided by 
theoretical output, as shown in Table 3.  
The mean efficiency is 0.84, but there are remarkable differences among courts. 
The courts of Milano Bologna and Trento are the most efficient because they are on the frontier. The courts of 
Trieste Ancona e Torino, have also demonstrated high performance levels. It easy to verify that the Southern-Italian 
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districts are in the lower half of the list, with the Court of Lecce as the only exception. This confirms the existence 
of a North-South divide with respect to efficiency of the Justice System. The District of Lecce holds the national 
record of 1,664 cases solved for each judge. It is more than 3 times the number per capita of cases solved in 
Caltanissetta (504).  
The biggest Italian districts, Naples (0.87) and Rome (0.77), are not very efficient.  
In the second part our table we have only Southern-Italian Districts, particularly Reggio Calabria, whose 
efficiency is few more than 60% of that of Milano. 
5. The internal determinants of Courts efficiency  
The stochastic frontier model does not allow to find the determinants of Courts efficiency, for this reason we 
decided to use a decision tree as a predictive model.  
The goal of decision trees is to predict or explain responses on a categorical dependent variable. A tree can be 
“learned” by splitting the source set into subsets based on an attribute value test and this process is repeated on each 
derived subset in a recursive manner called “recursive partitioning”. The recursion is completed when the units in a 
node have all the same value of the target variable, when splitting no longer adds value to the predictions or when 
the tree reach some “a priori” limits, given by the researcher (Breiman et al., 1984). This process of top-down 
induction of decision trees is by far the most common strategy for learning decision trees from data.  
We applied the CaRT algorithm of SPSS with minimum 2 cases in parent nodes and 1 case in child nodes: this 
low critical values are typical when “ecological units” (that is, units which contains all the observed cases of the 
population, not mere samples: this is the case here described) are analyzed. Such classification algorithm is able to 
find the best cut off points for the continuous variables. 
The segmentation analysis of the Courts (assumed as “ecological units”) was done using, as response variable, 
both the Technical Efficiency (see Tab. 3) and its binary classification, obtained considering the median value of 
0.868 as a cut-off point and classifying the Courts with a Technical Efficiency under and over the median. The 
results of the two trees are very similar, and therefore only the results obtained with the binary classification here are 
described, because they are clearer. 
The classification tree has 13 nodes, in 5 levels, with 7 terminal nodes (as said, the same results of the regression 
tree obtained using the Technical Efficiency). The segmentation levels measure the main part of importance of the 
involved variables.  
  Table 4. Independent Variable Importance. 
Independent Variable Importance Normalized Importance
Percentage of vacancies 0.302 100.0% 
"per capita" expenditures 0.248 82.3% 
"per capita" tapping 0.131 43.3% 
"per capita" procedure charge 0.110 36.5% 
 
The most important variable of this tree is the percentage of vacancies, obtained dividing the number of 
vacancies of the Courts by the number of judges in service. The 5 Courts that have a % of vacancies below 12.83 
have a Technical Efficiency above the median. The 21 Courts with a % of vacancies above 12.83 need more 
information to be classified. 
The five Courts with expenditures per capita (for judge in service) under 69,424 Euros for judge, have a 
estimated technical efficiency below the median, while the others are not easy to classify. For this reason we have to 
further distinguish the Courts with a per capita expenditure less the 94,322 Euros, that are more efficient, from the 
Courts with a higher expenditure per capita, that are less efficient. For the first group of Courts, then, it is important 
the number of tapping per capita: in fact, the five Courts with more then 12.31 interceptions per capita are more 
efficient with respect to the others. 
The nine Courts with per capita expenditures higher than 94,322 Euros can be considered efficient if have a 
percentage of vacancies below 14.87, and not efficient if the percentage of vacancies is above that limit. 
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Node 0
Category % n
50,0 13Less than good
50,0 13Good/excellent
Total 100 ,0 26
% vacancies
Improvement=0,119
E.T. Efficiency class
Node 1
Category % n
0,0 0Less than good
100 ,0 5Good/excellent
Total 19,2 5
<= 12,83
Node 2
Category % n
61,9 13Less than good
38,1 8Good/excellent
Total 80,8 21
"per capita" expenditures
Improvement=0,073
> 12,83
Node 3
Category % n
100 ,0 5Less than good
0,0 0Good/excellent
Total 19,2 5
<= 69424,56
Node 4
Category % n
50,0 8Less than good
50,0 8Good/excellent
Total 61,5 16
"per capita" expenditures
Improvement=0,122
> 69424,56
Node 5
Category % n
14,3 1Less than good
85,7 6Good/excellent
Total 26,9 7
"per capita" tapping
Improvement=0,027
<= 94321,78
Node 6
Category % n
77,8 7Less than good
22,2 2Good/excellent
Total 34,6 9
% vacancies
Improvement=0,120
> 94321,78
Node 7
Category % n
50,0 1Less than good
50,0 1Good/excellent
Total 7,7 2
% vacancies
Improvement=0,038
<= 12,31
Node 8
Category % n
0,0 0Less than good
100 ,0 5Good/excellent
Total 19,2 5
> 12,31
Node 9
Category % n
0,0 0Less than good
100 ,0 2Good/excellent
Total 7,7 2
<= 14,87
Node 10
Category % n
100 ,0 7Less than good
0,0 0Good/excellent
Total 26,9 7
> 14,87
Node 11
Category % n
0,0 0Less than good
100 ,0 1Good/excellent
Total 3,8 1
<= 17,48
Node 12
Category % n
100 ,0 1Less than good
0,0 0Good/excellent
Total 3,8 1
> 17,48
Less than good
Good/excellent
 
Fig. 2. Classification tree of Estimated Technical Efficiency of the Italian Justice Courts. 
We can say that the efficiency of a Court depends first of all by the percentage of vacancies, which has various 
critical values, based on the other characteristics, secondly by the per capita expenditures of the Court (which might 
be not too low, and not too high); only marginally, the Court efficiency depends by the per capita interceptions. 
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This results confirms that the Italian Judicial System need more resources in order to extinguish the large number 
of pending procedures. During this economic crisis period it is very difficult to find resources to solve this problem, 
for this reason the Italian authorities have taken a number of measures to address the inefficiencies and  bottlenecks 
in the functioning of the justice system These include measures to reduce case inflow (e.g., by increasing Court fees, 
creating appeal barriers, and changing lawyers’ fee).  
6. Final remarks 
This study is only a first attempt in analysing the phenomenon and has many areas for criticism. 
First of all, the lack information about the costs of civil and criminal justice forced us to consider together two 
systems that have many differences. Secondly, the districts considered for our analysis are quite big, so in the same 
area we can see efficient and inefficient units. 
The available data is unable to illustrate the causes of inefficiency, due to the lack of detailed data about cost of a 
single procedure, of administrative staff and/or the resources applied to the various procedures. 
Also, in order to analyze the efficiency of the different offices, the contextual factors must be considered. The 
court of Milan, which largely uses investigative techniques based on wiretaps to contrast corruption in public affairs 
and laundering money, cannot be compared with other districts with lour criminality  
It may prove interesting to conduct further research into estimates of separate models for civil, commercial and 
criminal cases and to consider cost frontier functions.  
The “Destination Italy” initiative presented in September 2013 reaffirms the government’s commitment to tackle 
the problems in the judicial system. The National Reform Program, outlining Italy’s targets towards the Europe 
2020 strategy; includes measures to:  
• Extend the competences of the commercial courts to all commercial litigation;  
• Introduce restrictions to appeals;  
• Allow parties to a mediation not to be assisted by a lawyer;  
• Extend the competences of judges of the peace;  
• Ensure the full operativity of the “e-civil process” (so-called “Processo Telematico Civile”) by June 2014;  
• Complete the “data warehouse” project 
• Monitor the implementation of the Administrative Procedure Code. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors of this study jointly designed and carried out the work described here. However, L. Antonucci edited 
the sections 2, 4 and 6 of this paper, C. Crocetta edited the section 3, while F. D. d’Ovidio edited the sections 1 and 5.  
References 
Aigner D.J., Lovell C.A.K., Schmidt P., 1977. Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier production functions. Journal of Econometrics, 6, 
21–37. 
Antonucci, L., Crocetta, C., d’Ovidio, F.D., Toma, E., 2011. Valutazione dell’efficienza amministrativa del sistema giudiziario tramite Data 
Envelopment Analysis, Annali del Dipartimento di Scienze Statistiche “Carlo Cecchi”, vol X, Cleup, Padova, 281-296. 
Battese G.E., Coelli T.J., 1992. Frontier Production Functions, Technical Efficiency and Panel Data: with Application to Paddy Farmers in India, 
Journal of Productivity Analysis, 3, 153-169. 
Battese, G.E., Corra G.S., 1977. Estimation of a Production Frontier Model: With Application to the Pastoral Zone of Eastern Australia, 
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 21, 169-179. 
Breiman L., Friedman J.H., Olshen R.A., Stone C.J., 1984. Classification and Regression Trees. Chapman & Hall, New York-London. 
Charnes A., Cooper W., Rhodes E., 1978. Measuring the efficiency of decision-making units, European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 2, 
429–444. 
Coelli T.J., 1996. A Guide to FRONTIER Version 4.1: A Computer Program for Stochastic Frontier Production and Cost function Estimation, 
CEPA Working Paper 96/07, Centre for Efficiency and Productivity Analysis (Department of Econometrics), University of New England, 
Armidale, Australia. 
130   Laura Antonucci et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  17 ( 2014 )  121 – 130 
Cook T., Johnson R., 1981. Measuring Court Performance. Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, USA. 
Meeusen,W., van den Broeck J., 1977. Efficiency estimation from Cobb-Douglas production functions with composed error, International 
economic review, Vol. 18(2), 435-444. 
Sciacca M., 2007. Gli strumenti di efficienza del sistema giudiziario e l’incidenza della capacità organizzativa del giudice, Rivista di Diritto 
Processuale, 643-661.  
Ministry of Justice, Official website: http://www.giustizia.it. 
